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TAXATION - FEDERAL ESTATE TAX - LIFE INSURANCE PAYABLE TO
SPECIFIC BENEFICIARY - Six life insurance policies were taken out by decedent upon his own life between March 19, 1925 and January 2, 1929. On
July 20, 1932 the decedent, by an instrument in writing, made an assignment
of the policies to his wife and named her the beneficiary under the policies. From
the date of the assignment until the date of his death, the decedent did not
possess any incidents of ownership of the policies though he continued to pay the
premiums. The wife of the decedent sued to recover the amount of the tax,
assessed and paid on the net proceeds from these policies in excess of $40,000,
under§ 302 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1924.1 Held, that the plaintiff could not
recover since the statute was broad enough to cover this situation and the tax
was valid, because life insurance is inherently testamentary in character and
because there is no absolute right to possession and enjoyment until insured's
death. Bailey v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 617.
In a later case decided on facts similar to those of the above cited case, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
§ 302 (g) did not authorize the tax where none of the legal incidents of ownership were retained by the insured. Chase National Bank v. United States,
(D. C. N. Y. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 947.
These cases again raise the long mooted question whether § 302 (g) is broad
enough to include the proceeds in excess of $40,000 on all policies payable to
"all other beneficiaries" regardless whether insured retains any control over the
policy until death. This question has never been decided by the Supreme Court,
but in Chase National Bank v. United States,2 in which the Supreme Court
held the tax valid where the insured had retained the right to change the beneficiary, there is language which indicates that such a tax would not be applicable
if none of the incidents of ownership were retained by the decedent. Two rules
of statutory construction are applicable in construing this statutory provision:
(I) taxing statutes are not to be extended, by implication, beyond the clear
import of the language used, 8 and ( 2) statutes susceptible of two constructions

1 43 Stat. L. 305, still in effect as 26 U.S. C. (1935), § 4II: "The value of
the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time
of his death of all property . . . (g) To the extent of the amount receivable by the
executor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life;
and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other
beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
2 278 U. S. 327, 49 S. Ct. 126 (1929).
8 Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 38 S. Ct. 53 (1917); United States v. Merriam,
263 U.S. 179, 44 S. Ct. 69 (1923); Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U.S. 238, 45 S. Ct. 487
(1925).
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must be construed, if possible, so as to avoid the raising of grave and doubtful
constitutional questions. 4 On examination of § 302 (g), the language seems
to provide clearly and simply for taxation of the proceeds of the policies designated therein without exception.5 But the words of a single provision in a
statute cannot be read alone; rather they must be read and construed with regard to other parts of the statute. Looking, then, to the other parts of § 302,
all of which deal with taxation of property transferred in contemplation of
death or property passing out of the control, possession, or enjoyment of decedent at his death, 6 it is apparent that they require retention of some control or
interest by the decedent during his life, unless the transfer is made in contemplation of death. 7 In the light of these provisions, it is at least doubtful that
the general language of§ 302 (g) was used by Congress with the intention of
making insurance proceeds the only instance where a death tax could be levied
on an inter vivos transfer not in contemplation of death without retention by
decedent of some control or interest until death. 8 Furthermore § 301 (a) imposes a tax upon "the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." 9
When this section is read in connection with § 302 (g), as it must be, the
latter section is limited to policies in which there is some shifting of the decedent's
interest as a result of death.10 Thus, at best, the meaning of § 302 (g) is
ambiguous. If this section is given the broader of the two possible constructions,
serious constitutional questions will arise; 11 and so, in keeping with the above
stated rules of statutory construction, § 302 (g) should not be applied to the
proceeds of insurance policies where there was a complete and irrevocable inter
vivos transfer of same. Under the other provisions of § 302 the courts have refused to apply the tax to cases in which there was not a substantial degree of
interest or control retained by decedent unless the language of the statute clearly
4
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 at 408, 29 S. Ct.
527 (1909); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 658 (1916);
Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 41 S. Ct. 271 (1921); Lewellyn v. Frick, 268
U. S. 238, 45 S. Ct. 487 (1925); Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339,
49 S. Ct. 123 (1929).
5
Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927); Untermeyer v.
Anderson, 276 U~ S. 440, 48 S. Ct. 353 (1928).
6
Section 302 (b), dower and curtesy; (c, d), gift in contemplation of or to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death; (e), property held jointly or by the
entirety; (f), power of appointment.
7
It is not significant that the statute does not require retention of some interest
or control in the case of inter vivos transfers in contemplation of death. Acts done in
contemplation of death have always been treated by the law as of a distinct and peculiar
nature, not to be controlled by ordinary rules of law, e.g., the distinction of gifts
causa mortis from inter vivos gifts.
8 It would require "plain and compelling language" to subject inter vivos transfers
to a death tax. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929).
9
Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61, 44 S. Ct. 293 (1923); Young Mens' Christian Assn. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47, 44 S. Ct. 291 (1923).
10 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929).
11 Llewellyn v. Frick, 268 U.S. 238, 45 S. Ct. 487 (1925); Chase Nat. Bank v.
United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 S. Ct. 126 (1929); Reinecke v. Northern Trust
Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929).
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compelled it.12 Of significance, too, is the fact that the Treasury Department
interprets § 302 (g) as applicable only if the decedent possessed at the time of
his death some of the legal incidents of ownership.13
But even though the ambiguity in § 302 (g) is resolved in favor of the
broadest possible interpretation, there is still the constitutional hurdle which
must be "cleared" before the tax can be validly enforced. In the Bailey case
the question of the constitutionality of an estate tax upon the proceeds of insurance which has been completely and irrevocably assigned before death was
decided in favor of the tax for the first time.14 There are a number of possible
bases for upholding the constitutionality of the tax, none of which seem too
convincing: ( l) that the act conclusively presumes that the assignment was in
contemplation of death, ( 2) that the transfer is designed to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after death, (3) that the tax is in the nature of a
"deferred" gift tax, ( 4) that an insurance policy is a testamentary disposition.
To say that § 302 (g) conclusively presumes that the assignment was in contemplation of death stretches both the intent of Congress and that of the decedent. A conclusive presumption, to be constitutional, must be reasonable, and
there is little reason in this presumption, which pays no heed to the usual meaning given the words "in contemplation of death." 15 Theories (2) and (4) are
an attempt to satisfy the contention that a tax on completed inter vivos transfers
12 Sec. 302 (d) provides for death tax where the right to "alter, amend, or
revoke" is reserved to the settlor. But the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Helmholz,
296 U. S. 93, 56 S. Ct. 68 (1935), and White v. Poor, 296 U. S. 98, 56 S. Ct. 66
(1935), held that a retention of the power to "terminate" was not within the purview
of the statute. By amendment in the Revenue Act of 1936 the word "terminate" was
added to sec. 302 (d), 49 Stat. L. 1744 (1936).
Likewise under§ 302 (c) the Supreme Court consistently held that retention of
a life interest in the income of a trust was not sufficient to satisfy the statute until § 302
( c) was amended specifically to include a life interest in income. See also Knouff, "Death
Taxes on Completed Transfers Inter Vivas," 36 M1cH. L. REV. 1284 at 1293, 1301
(1937).
18
Treas. Reg. So, art. 27 (1937). Congress has failed, in its revisions of the estate
tax from 1932 to 1938, to make any amendment as regards this administrative interpretation. Under a peculiar canon of construction, this "amounts to an implied legislative sanctification of the Regulations, embedding them firmly into the matrix of the
statute." Paul, "Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARv. L. REV. 1037
at 1049 (1939). See National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 40 S. Ct.
237 (1920); Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 50 S. Ct. II5 (1930); Helvering
v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79, 58 S. Ct. 45 (1938).
H The question of the constitutionality of a tax under the circumstances of the
principal case has never been decided by the Supreme Court. However, there is
language in Chase Nat. Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 S. Ct. 126 (1929),
which indicates that the Court felt that such a tax would be unconstitutional. In the
recent case of Chase National Bank v. United States, (D. C. N. Y. 1939) 28 F.
Supp. 947, the district court never reached the constitutional question since it held the
tax statute inapplicable. See also Helburn v. Ballard, (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) 85 F.
(2d) 613; Walker v. United States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 103; Boswell
v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 970 (1938).
15
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 46 S. Ct. 260 (1926).
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of insurance is a direct tax 16 rather than a tax on the transfer of property. The
statute purports to be a tax on "transfers" but a direct :tax cannot be made into
an excise tax by calling it such.17 There must be some transfer of property at
death to which the tax can attach.18 Using property in the ordinary legal sense,
i.e., a "bundle of rights," it is clear that, by a complete inter vivos assignment
of all of the rights incident to the ownership of the policy, there is no property
in the insurance policy to be transferred at death.19 The advent of death simply
makes the rights which decedent transferred inter •vivos more valuable, but
transfers nothing. 20 But the court may choose to view property in a practical
manner, i.e., as "economic benefits." 21 However, a tax on economic benefits
passing at death appears to be a direct tax, for it is a tax on property not trans!erred, but created by death. The insured never owned the property created by
his death, so how can he be taxed for the transfer of something he never had?
Furthermore, conceiving of property as "economic benefits" converts a tax
designed by the statute as a transfer tax into a succession tax. A transfer tax
is a tax on the transfer of decedent's estate, while a succession tax is a tax on
the completion of the shifting of the economic benefits and burdens of property.
To say that this is a transfer taking effect in possession and enjoyment at or after
death is inconsistent with the £~ct that every right of enjoyment incident to the
fosurance policy, e.g., the right to surrender :the policy for its cash value, etc.,
is vested in the assignee before the death of the insured. 22 If this is, in fact, a gift
tax [theory (3)] on an inter vivas :transaction 23 and deferred till death for
16 A· tax "imposed upon property solely by reason of its ownership" is direct.
,Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 at 81; 20 S. Ct. 747 (1900); Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan &Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673 (1895). See also 39 HARv. L. REV.
.888 at 889 (1926).
17 Cf. Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 255 U. S. 288 at
294, 41 S. Ct. 272 (1921); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429
at 583, 15 S. Ct. 673 (1895).
18 Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U. S. 543, 27 S. Ct. 174 (1906); Orr v. Gilman,
183 U.S. 278, 22 S. Ct. 213 (1901); Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466, 27 S. Ct.
550 (1906); Helburn v. Ballard, (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 613; Walker
v. United States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 103; Boswell v. Commissioner,
37 B. T. A. 970 (1938); May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 50 S. Ct. 286 (1929);
Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 51 S. Ct. 306 (1930).
19 Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124, 50 S. Ct. 46 (1929); Tyler v.
Treasurer, 226 Mass. 306, 115 N. E. 300 (1917).
20 May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238, 50 S. Ct. 286 (1929); Boyd v. United States,
(D. C. Conn. 1929) 34 F. (2d). 488; Miller v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 404
(1926).
21 44 YALE L. J. 1245 at 1247 (1935).
22 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929);
May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 50 S. Ct. 286 (1929); Burnet v. Northern Trust
Co., 283 U •.S•. 782, 51 S. Ct. 34-2 (1930); Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783, 51 S. Ct.
343 (1930); Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582, 51 S. Ct. 306 (1930); Binney v.
Long, 299 U. S. 280, 57 S. Ct. 206 (1936). See also, Rottschaefer, "Taxation of
Transfers Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoyment at Grantor's Death,"
14 MINN. L. REV. 613 (1930).
28 Indicating that this may be like a gift tax: Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S.
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collection, as of what time should the value of the property be ascertained for
purposes of the tax? The gift is actually made at a time when the insurance
policy is of comparatively little cash value so if the tax is levied on the basis of
the greatly enhanced value of the insurance policy at the death of the insured,
it would seem to be an arbitrary and capricious classication of property for tax
purposes. However, opposed to all the foregoing arguments is the very practical
argument that life insurance offers an attractive method of escaping death taxes,
and that this consideration should be sufficient to warrant the inclusion of the
proceeds of all policies in the decedent's estate for death tax purposes. Certainly
the Supreme Court's decision in Helvering v. Bullard 24 indicates considerable
liberality in permitting Congress to classify certain inter vivos transactions as
taxable under the estate tax law. 25
Roy L. Steinheimer

297, 58 S. Ct. 565 (1937); Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195, 9 S. Ct.
41 (1888). Contra: Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 S. Ct.
123 (1929).
24 303 U. S. 297, 58 S. Ct. 565 (1937), reversing (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 90
F. (2d) 144. How far the Supreme Court will follow its language in the Bullard
case is problematical. It is important to note, however, that there the tax was assessed
under § 302 (c) and not § 302 (g) and there was retention of the life income from
the trust in the settlor. For a complete analysis of the ramifications of the Bullard case,
see Knouff, "Death Taxes on Completed Transfers Inter Vivos," 36 M1cH. L. REV.
1284 (1937).
25 For general discussions of the problems raised by estate taxation of insurance,
see Oppenheimer, "Proceeds of Life Insurance Policies under the Federal Estate Tax,"
43 HARV. L. REV. 724 ( I 930) ; Paul, "Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax,"
52 HARv. L. REv. 1037 (1939).

